Dr Matthew Chrisman
Dr Chrisman (PhD University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) teaches ethics and philosophy of language. He is currently working on a book The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics (under contract, OUP), which seeks to improve on his previous work in metaethics by integrating it with new work on model-theoretic approaches to the semantics of modals. He is also interested in epistemology, action theory, political philosophy, deontic logic and the ethics of climate change.
Dr Chrisman routinely teaches the following courses at the University of Edinburgh:
- Morality and Value
- Advanced Philosophical Method
- Value Theory II
- Philosophy of Action
- Environmental Ethics
He is also part of the team developing the Introduction to Philosophy (Massive Open Online Course) and the associated textbook Philosophy for Everyone, edited with Duncan Pritchard, Routledge (2013).
Other Pedagogical Resources
'Deontic Modals' Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming).
'Epistemic Expressivism' Philosophy Compass (2012).
'Ethical Expressivism' in The Continuum Companion to Ethics, Christian Miller, ed. Continuum (2011).
'Using Big Words to Explain Little Words' in Think 29, Vol. 10 (Autumn 2011).
'Emotivism' in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, ed. (2013).
Here's a short video explaining Dr Chrisman's current research project:
(The links below are to penultimate drafts. For the definitive and final versions, please consult the relevant journal or book.)
'Attitudinal Expressivism and Logical Pragmatism in Metaethics' in Pragmatism, Law, and Language, G. Hubbs and D. Lind (eds.) New York: Routledge, (forthcoming).
'The Normative Evaluation of Belief and the Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions' Journal of Philosophy CIX: 588-612, (2012).
'"Ought" and Control' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90 (3) (2012).
'On the Meaning of "Ought" Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 7, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2012).
'Is Epistemic Expressivism Compatible with Inquiry?' (with J. Adam Carter) Philosophical Studies, 159(3) (2012).
'Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Theory of Meaning' in New Waves in Metaethics, Brady, ed., Palgrave-Macmillan (2010).
'Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge' in a special issue of International Journal of Philosophical Studies, James O'Shea, ed. in conjunction with Naturalism, Normativity, and the Space of Reasons Conference at University College Dublin (2010).
'The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth' in Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg, O'Shea and Rubenstein, eds. (2010).
'From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism' in Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard (eds.) Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press (2010).
'Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-)Knowledge' Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 9, no. 3 (2009).
'Ethical Neo-Expressivism' (with Dorit Bar-On) in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4 (2009).
'Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 77, no. 2, (2008).
'Ought to Believe' in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. CV, no. 7, (July 2008).
'From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism' in Philosophical Studies, vol. 135, no. 2 (2007).
Reviews and Critical Notices
'A Dilemma for Moral Fictionalism' in Philosophical Books, Volume 49 (2008).
Review of William P. Alston's Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation in International Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 15, issue 2 (2007).
Review of Russ Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism: A Defense in Ethics Volume 116, Number 1 (2005).
Review of Alan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live in Ethics Volume 115, Number 2 (2005).
Friday 9am - 10am
(or by appointment)