School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Dr Allan Hazlett

Photograph of Dr Allan Hazlett
Position
Reader
Phone
0131 650 3654
Location
5.08 (DSB)
Research Interests
Epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics
Biography

Dr Hazlett received his PhD from Brown University in 2006, and has taught at Texas Tech University, Fordham University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Edinburgh.  He was awarded the 2007 Rutgers Young Epistemologist Prize, and since 2012 has served as the Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association. Dr Hazlett is the author of A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University press, 2013) and A Critical Introduction to Skepticism (Bloomsbury, 2014). He works on (among other things) the value of accurate representation, the pragmatics of knowledge attributions, the nature and epistemic value of fiction, and issues in social epistemology.

Teaching

In 2014-15, Dr Hazlett will teach Scepticism (Honours/MSc), and Epistemology 2 (MSc). He'll also be the course organizer for Knowledge and Reality (pre-Honours).

In the past he's taught Themes in Epistemology, as well as other courses in epistemology, metaphysics, moral psychology, logic, early modern philosophy, and aesthetics.

Dr Hazlett is available to supervise students (at all levels) working in his areas of interest.

Research

Dr Hazlett's research is currently funded by an AHRC Early Career Fellowship on Intellectual Virtue and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemic Values. He works on questions like these:

  • Why is accurate represenation valuable (if it is)? Why prefer accuracy to inaccuracy?
  • True belief is a species of accurate representation: beliefs are correct if and only if their content is true, and incorrect otherwise. What other things can be correct and incorrect? Some possibilities: pictures, instances of theorizing about explanatory structure, desires, and episodes of imagination.
  • What are "intellectual virtues"? Why should we be intellectually virtuous (if we should)?
  • What is authenticity ("being true to yourself"), and in what sense, if any, is it good to be authentic?
  • What are the metaphysical "sources" of normativity (value, reasons, "oughts")? Do we care about things because they are valuable, or are they valuable because, or in as much as, we care about them?
  • What's the relationship between questions about the semantics, pragmatics, and genealogy of normative language and metaphysical questions about the existence of value, reasons, and obligations?
  • We seem to value intellectual solidarity: we often base our beliefs on the testimony of other people, and prefer consensus and agreement to discord and disagreement. What are the costs and benefits of the kind of dependence involved in testimonial trust? What are the costs and benefits of shared knowledge? Why are we insulted when someone chooses not to believe what we say? Why is insincerity bad?

Books

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Edited volumes

  • The Gettier Problem at 50, special issue of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).  Contributors: Yuri Cath, Lisa Miracchi, Erik Olsson, Christian Piller, Duncan Pritchard, Amber Riaz, and Timothy Williamson.  
  • New Waves in Metaphysics (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010).  Contributors: Ross Cameron, Sarah Chant, Joshua Glasgow, Neal Judisch, Uriah Kriegel, Doug Kutach, Allan Hazlett, Rae Langton and Christopher Robichaud, Mari Mikkola, Kristie Miller, Alyssa Ney, Jay Odenbaugh, and Carolina Sartorio.  

Selected papers

  • “Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement,” Episteme 11(1) (2014), pp. 1-25.  
  • "Authenticity and Self-Knowledge" (with Simon D. Feldman), dialectica 67(2) (2013), pp. 157-81.
  • "What's Bad About Bad Faith?" (with Simon D. Feldman), European Journal of Philosophy 21(1) (2013), pp. 50-73.
  • "Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility," Episteme 9(3) (2012), pp. 205-23.
  • “Unrealistic Fictions” (with Christy Mag Uidhir), American Philosophical Quarterly 48(1) (2011), pp. 33-46.
  • "Non-Moral Evil," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (2012), pp. 18-34.
  • "The Myth of Factive Verbs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80(3) (2010), pp. 497-522.
  • "Knowledge and Conversation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3) (2009), pp. 591-620.

Forthcoming papers

  • "The Normativity of Mind-World Relations: Comments on Sosa," Episteme, forthcoming.  
  • "Moorean Pragmatics, Social Comparisons, and Common Knowledge" in N.L.L. Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement (Oxford University Press).
  • "Epistemic Goods," in G. Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being (Routledge).
  • "Intellectual Loyalty," International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, special issue on “Hinge Epistemology,” edited by A. Coliva and D. Moyal-Sharrock.

Work in progress

Work in preparation

  • "Against Individualistic Accounts of the Badness of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony"
  • "Imagination that Amounts to Knowledge from Fiction"
  • "Skepticism and Intellectual Humility as Civic Virtues"
  • "Ambivalence and the Inconsistency of the Good" (with Simon D. Feldman)
  • "Truthfulness without Truth"
  • "What Does "Epistemic" Mean?"
  • "Authenticity as an Intellectual Virtue"
  • "Epistemic Criticism: Vindicated or Debunked?"

Curriculum Vitae

Dr Hazlett's CV (pdf).

Administrative Roles

  • Deputy Postgraduate Advisor for Research (Philosophy)
  • Course Organiser for Knowledge and Reality
  • Equality and Diversity Committee member (PPLS)
  • Secretary (Scots Philosophical Association)

Contact

Email: A.Hazlett@ed.ac.uk

Post: Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, United Kingdom