Dr Allan Hazlett
Dr Hazlett received his PhD from Brown University in 2006, and has taught at Texas Tech University, Fordham University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Edinburgh. He was awarded the 2007 Rutgers Young Epistemologist Prize, and since 2012 has served as the Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association. Dr Hazlett is the author of A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University press, 2013) and A Critical Introduction to Skepticism (Bloomsbury, 2014). He works on (among other things) the value of accurate representation, the pragmatics of knowledge attributions, the nature and epistemic value of fiction, and issues in social epistemology.
In 2013-14, Dr Hazlett will organize Knowledge and Reality (2nd-year) and Epistemology 2 (MSc).
In the past he's taught Themes in Epistemology and Scepticism, as well as other courses in epistemology, metaphysics, moral psychology, logic, early modern philosophy, and aesthetics.
Dr Hazlett is available to supervise students (at all levels) in several areas, including epistemology.
Dr Hazlett's research is currently funded by an AHRC Early Career Fellowship on Intellectual Virtue and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemic Values. He works on questions like these:
- Why is accurate represenation valuable (if it is)? Why prefer accuracy to inaccuracy?
- True belief is a species of accurate representation: beliefs are correct if and only if their content is true, and incorrect otherwise. What other things can be correct and incorrect? Some possibilities: pictures, instances of theorizing about explanatory structure, desires, and episodes of imagination.
- What are "intellectual virtues"? Why should we be intellectually virtuous (if we should)?
- What is authenticity ("being true to yourself"), and in what sense, if any, is it good to be authentic?
- What are the metaphysical "sources" of normativity (value, reasons, "oughts")? Do we care about things because they are valuable, or are they valuable because, or in as much as, we care about them?
- What's the relationship between questions about the semantics, pragmatics, and genealogy of normative language and metaphysical questions about the existence of value, reasons, and obligations?
- We seem to value intellectual solidarity: we often base our beliefs on the testimony of other people, and prefer consensus and agreement to discord and disagreement. What are the costs and benefits of the kind of dependence involved in testimonial trust? What are the costs and benefits of shared knowledge? Why are we insulted when someone chooses not to believe what we say? Why is insincerity bad?
- A Critical Introduction to Skepticism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).
- A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University Press, 2013).
- The Gettier Problem at 50, special issue of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
- New Waves in Metaphysics (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010).
- “Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement,” Episteme 11(1) (2014), pp. 1-25.
- "Authenticity and Self-Knowledge" (with Simon D. Feldman), dialectica 67(2) (2013), pp. 157-81.
- "What's Bad About Bad Faith?" (with Simon D. Feldman), European Journal of Philosophy 21(1) (2013), pp. 50-73.
- "Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility," Episteme 9(3) (2012), pp. 205-23.
- “Unrealistic Fictions” (with Christy Mag Uidhir), American Philosophical Quarterly 48(1) (2011), pp. 33-46.
- "Non-Moral Evil," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (2012), pp. 18-34.
- "The Myth of Factive Verbs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80(3) (2010), pp. 497-522.
- "Knowledge and Conversation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3) (2009), pp. 591-620.
- "Moorean Pragmatics, Social Comparisons, and Common Knowledge" in N.L.L. Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement (Oxford University Press).
- "Epistemic Goods," in G. Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being (Routledge).
- "Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse," in A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Cambridge University Press).
- "Intellectual Loyalty," International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, special issue on “Hinge Epistemology,” edited by A. Coliva and D. Moyal-Sharrock.
Work in progress
- "Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal"
- "Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness"
- "Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox" (with Kenneth Boyce)
- "Truthfulness without Truth"
Work in preparation
- "What Does "Epistemic" Mean?"
- "The Social Value of Preferring Non-Testimonial Belief"
- "Mitigated Skepticism as a Social Virtue"
- "Two Concepts of Intellectual Virtue"
- "Authenticity as an Intellectual Virtue"
- "Ambivalence and the Inconsistency of the Good" (with Simon D. Feldman)
- "Epistemic Criticism: Vindicated or Debunked?"
Dr Hazlett's CV (pdf).
- Deputy Postgraduate Advisor for Research (Philosophy)
- Course Organiser for Knowledge and Reality
- Equality and Diversity Committee member (PPLS)
- Secretary (Scots Philosophical Association)
Post: Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, United Kingdom