

From Moral Norm-Expressivism to Epistemic Norm-Expressivism

I Introduction

Recent debates in epistemology exhibit a growing sensitivity to the dialectical parallel between ethics and epistemology¹. That is, theoretical positions and arguments predominantly first applied in ethics, seem to also carry over to epistemology and many ethicists and epistemologists are increasingly becoming aware of it².

This dialectical parallel is far from being a mere accident or coincidence. A good explanation of the dialectical parallel constitutes the fact that the two philosophical domains share a lot of common characteristics³. A key one is that they are both normative domains. As such, ethics is concerned with ‘what one ought to do’ and epistemology with ‘what one ought to believe’ and, arguably, both are constitutive of the more general normative question of ‘how should one live?’; a question going all the way back to Plato.

The growing sensitivity to the ethics-epistemology dialectical parallel has led philosophers to borrow theoretical schemes and arguments mostly applied to ethics and transpose them to epistemology. In consequence, this cued the arrival and exploration of largely neglected approaches to epistemological theorising. A well-known example is virtue epistemology that grew out of ‘twin’ virtue ethics and it is much in vogue nowadays in various (internalist and externalist) guises⁴.

Here I try my own hand. I embark from A.Gibbard’s(1990) moral norm-expressivism towards a form of epistemic norm-expressivism. That is, I make a first preliminary gesture towards a norm-expressivist account of the semantics of epistemic justification claims and attributions (and, more generally, epistemic evaluations as such). My claim here is a very a modest one. I only claim that at least some of the explanatory fruit moral norm-expressivism promises to reap is equally promised to be

¹ See L.Zagzebski (1996); H.Field (2000); M.Ridge (2007); M.Chrisman (2007).

² No doubt there are also disparities between ethics and epistemology but these are not important enough to vitiate the dialectical parallel. An important one is so-called ‘practicality’. That is, moral evaluations seem to be practical, that is, motivating for action in a way that epistemic evaluations aren’t.

³ The dialectical parallel is drawn in more detail in L.Zagzebski (1996); C.Kyriacou (2009).

⁴ See L.Zagzebski(1996) and E.Sosa(2007) for, respectively, an internalist and externalist version.

reaped by epistemic norm-expressivism. Of course, this is not to vindicate epistemic norm-expressivism as such, but it is a good first step towards motivating epistemic norm-expressivism as a theoretical approach to the semantics of epistemic discourse.

Here is the argumentative plan of what is to follow. In section II, the conceptual framework of A.Gibbard's(1990) norm-expressivism for moral discourse is briefly introduced and, afterwards, in section III transposed to epistemic discourse (with some Sellarsian(1997) overtones). In section IV, it is sketched some of the explanatory fruit that like its moral twin epistemic norm-expressivism promises to reap and, finally, in section V the argument of the paper is summarized.

II A.Gibbard's Moral Norm-Expressivism

In this section, I introduce the conceptual framework of A.Gibbard's(1990) norm-expressivism for moral discourse intended to be transposed to epistemic discourse in the next section. A.Gibbard's(1990:4-5) sophisticated 'norm-expressivism' sets out searching for an understanding of 'what 'rational' means' and how an understanding of the meaning of 'rational' could subsequently elucidate the species of moral rationality. What makes our moral choices to 'make sense' or 'to be wise'.

He(1990:6-12) patently renounces a '*referential semantic strategy*' in favour of a '*use semantic strategy*' as an approach to the meaning of rationality claims and attributions. That is, he rebuffs referentialist efforts to either reduce rationality to any naturalistic property or to assert that there is an irreducible nonnatural rationality property. Instead, he suggests that we should start with how rationality claims and attributions are actually *being used* in linguistic practice.

Gibbard's dialectic manoeuvre is subtle. For Gibbard's dialectic manoeuvre crucially *reverses* the order of (semantic) explanation. Referentialists start with alleged analyses of the nature of normative properties like rationality, justification, goodness etc. and think that endorsement will simply follow from the correct analysis. Once we have the correct analysis of such normative notions, they presume, endorsement will nicely fall in place.

Due to Moorean semantic considerations, however, this does not seem to be forthcoming. For, as G.E.Moore(2000) famously suggested with his 'open question argument', a clear-headed and thoughtful agent, without any semantic confusion, can always raise doubts and resist the reduction of a moral property M(e.g. goodness) to a natural property N(e.g. usefulness). He can always raise doubts and resist the

reduction because there is an inherent semantic ‘open feel’ in any such purported reduction. In the face of this inherent semantic ‘open feel’, an agent can always question and resist the purported reduction with expressions like: ‘I understand what desirability or usefulness is, but I don’t see how or why desirability or usefulness is good’⁵.

In the face of ‘the open question argument’ and the pessimism it inspires, Gibbard reverses the order of explanation. He starts with the use of these sentences and the element of endorsement and sets out to explain norms of (moral) rationality as something following from this use. That is, he sets out from our attitude of endorsement to what we take to be rational and how this endorsement seems to be licensed by certain norms. Norms that constrain what can count as rational and what cannot. These norms, however, are neither somehow meant to be ‘out there’ nor they are meant to be mind-independent and objective in the traditional realist fashion. They are norms following from the use of justification claims and attributions by epistemic agents.

With Gibbard’s reversal of the order of explanation and the invocation of a ‘use semantic strategy’, the notion of norm-endorsement comes to lie at the heart of the proposal. Gibbard claims that the use of such normative sentences indicates the importance of the ingredient of norm-endorsement and that this should be the *cornerstone* for a theory of the semantics of rationality claims and attributions. As he puts (1990:6) it: ‘...start with the use of the term. Fix on the dictum ‘To call a thing rational is to endorse it’, and search for a sense of ‘endorse’ for which the dictum holds true’.

He then adds (1990:7) that ‘to call something rational is to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it’. According to Gibbard, the meaning of ‘rational’ should be understood in terms of the noncognitive state of mind it expresses, namely, the nonreferential attitude of acceptance (or endorsement) to norms that license the action, event or belief in question.

Gibbard has some very good reasons for making the notion of norm-endorsement the cornerstone of his theoretical construction. For, on the one hand, referentialist

⁵ Of course, as W.Frankena(1939) pointed out, Moore’s argument begs the question because it *presupposes* that there is no natural property reducing goodness. But this is to preclude that such a reduction could be accomplished in the future and therefore Moore’s argument is inconclusive. Yet, philosophers sympathetic to the ‘open question argument’ only take it to be an inference to best explanation for the reality of our ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions. See for example M.Ridge (2003).

approaches seem to exactly *miss* the element of endorsement⁶. As you might recall, ‘the open question argument’ suggested that it is always possible for a clear-headed agent, without any semantic confusion, to question whether any natural property N (e.g. full information, desire satisfaction) is synonymous with a normative property N* (e.g. rationality) and therefore resist endorsement of the belief in question. I can see, he might retort, the full information about the facts but I can’t see why full information makes them rational.

As Gibbard(1990:10) puts it: ‘On that diagnosis, what descriptivistic analyses miss is a general element of endorsement- an element an expressivistic analysis can capture’. And an expressivist analysis can capture this ingredient of endorsement because it reverses the order of explanation and starts with what agents endorse when they use rationality claims and attributions. What they endorse when they state that ‘□-ing is rational’ or ‘S’s □-ing is rational’.

On the other hand, Gibbard is attaching to endorsement the ‘norm-’ prefix because ‘a sense of ‘endorse’’ should have something to do with norms. For, intuitively, norms seem to constraint what can count as rational (moral or epistemic) and what cannot. Gibbard is sensitive to this fact and wisely, although wants to dispense with ‘robust’ norms or facts (realistically construed) about rationality, he does not want to relinquish the normative element inherent in rationality claims and attributions. As he(1990:8) says, ‘In many ways, normative judgements mimic factual judgements, and indeed factual judgements themselves rest on norms...Normative discussion is much like factual discussion, I shall be claiming, and just as indispensable’.

This concise sketch delivers the contours of the conceptual framework of Gibbard’s moral norm-expressivism. Yet, we should not fail to appreciate what motivates his overall norm-expressivist project. Gibbard’s motivation for a ‘use semantic strategy’ and a norm-expressivist account of rationality stems from his strong commitment to general methodological naturalism. Gibbard, as a philosopher with methodologically naturalistic orientation, intends to firmly situate the genus of rationality (and the species of moral rationality) in nature.

To that effect, he also speculates about the naturalistic origins of norms and moral norms in specific. His intriguing speculations suggest that the human capacity to ‘accept or endorse norms’ has been the product of biological adaptation through

⁶ See Gibbard(1990:10).

Darwinian natural selection⁷. This capacity has been adapted through natural selection for serving a certain evolutionary advantageous functional purpose.

The functional purpose of our capacity for judgemental endorsement of norms is to coordinate interpersonal interaction in a way that would enhance our reproductive success and survival chances. It is to coordinate social life and cooperation often with mutual benefit for the persons involved. Gibbard(1990:66) calls this kind of evolutionary advantageous coordination ‘mutual fitness-enhancing coordination’.

In line with this thoroughly naturalistic picture, Gibbard also speculates about the evolutionary origins of our ‘emotional propensities’, often involved in expressing our attitudes of norm-endorsement. According to Gibbard, they are largely the consequence of our evolutionary history. They had been adapted to function as social lubricants that regulate coordination and guide social co-operation.

Now, my intention is to borrow Gibbard’s(1990) norm-expressivist framework for moral discourse and apply it to epistemic discourse and, in particular, to epistemic justification which is the specific object of my inquiry. I will use it as an approach to the semantics of epistemic justification claims and attributions (or cognates) and in section IV briefly explore at least some of the relative explanatory fruitfulness, if any, such an approach could bear.

It should be made clear, however, that as far as the question of the origins of our epistemic norms is concerned, I won’t mimic Gibbard’s evolutionary speculations about the origins of moral norms and choose to largely demur. It would be deeply interesting to parallel Gibbard’s speculations about the evolutionary origins of moral norms and speculate about the evolutionary origins of epistemic norms, but this parallel would lead us too far from what the scope of this work allows.

The idea, though, is bold and challenging and not obviously misguided or incoherent. Indeed, there are philosophers who speculate along those evolutionary lines like R.Millikan(2003), D.Papineau(2003) and, also, Gibbard’s(2003) own later work on epistemic reliance-expressivism fits nicely in such a context. Unfortunately, I will have to forgo here the chance for speculative rumination on the origins of our epistemic norms and I will remain neutral about their provenance. I retain, though, the desire to revisit this intriguing issue within a more opportune setting.

⁷ Gibbard’s(1990: 29-30, 256) invocation of evolutionary theory is subtle. He is well aware of the complexities surrounding evolutionary theory and his approach cannot be seen, I think, as a form of crude adaptationism.

With Gibbard's(1990) norm-expressivist conceptual framework introduced, in the next subsection we take the second promised step. We apply the norm-expressivist conceptual framework to the semantics of justification claims and attributions.

IV From Moral Norm-Expressivism to Epistemic Norm-Expressivism

With the brief presentation of the conceptual framework of Gibbard's norm-expressivism at hand (and its methodologically naturalistic motivation), let us now take the promised second step. The second step is to adopt the norm-expressivist framework and transpose it to epistemic discourse. In the footsteps of Gibbard, the norm-expressivist proposal starts from the claim that a '*referential semantic strategy*' as an approach to the meaning of propositional sentences predicating 'is epistemically justified' (or cognates) is misguided.

When we use justification claims and attributions we don't purport to refer to a certain epistemic justification property (natural or nonnatural). The semantic function of such normative sentences is not referential at all. Instead, it is expressive of noncognitive and nonreferential mental states. As a result, we should neither strive to reduce the notion of epistemic justification to necessary and sufficient conditions nor postulate a sui generis property of epistemic justification. We should not postulate the existence of an epistemic justification property at all.

Instead, it suggests that we should employ a Wittgenstenian-Sellarsian '*use semantic strategy*' for understanding the meaning of justification claims and attributions. This is the paramount dialectical manoeuvre for building a theory of semantics for such sentences. We should start with how propositional sentences predicating 'is epistemically justified' (or cognates) are actually *being used* in linguistic practice⁸. The idea is that the actual use of such sentences in linguistic practice will reveal to us how the meaning of these sentences is being determined.

Gibbard does not discuss much his employment of a 'use semantic strategy' and, since this dialectical manoeuvre seems to be significant for the whole exploration, allow me to devote some more lines on this score. The use semanticist rebukes the referentialist presupposition that to know the meaning of a concept is to know (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a faculty of 'intuition') the property the concept purports to refer to as, on the one hand, unnecessarily over-

⁸ Notable 'use theorists' include late L.Wittgenstein(1988), , P.Grice(1989), W.Sellars(1997) and R.Brandom(2000).

intellectualizing linguistic practice and, on the other hand, as having unpalatable epistemological and ontological implications. As a matter of principle, use semanticists are deeply sceptical about the idea of building a theory of semantics for normative sentences around the notion of reference.

Rather, the use semanticist starts from the claim that to know the meaning of a concept is to have *practical mastery of the use* of a concept⁹. It is to know how to apply the concept correctly in given circumstances and contexts¹⁰. For such practical know-how, knowledge of the property the concept -allegedly- purports to refer to is unnecessary. On the contrary, what is vitally necessary is the practical ability to apply the concept correctly from case to case and from context to context.

Such use semanticists are typically antirealists/nominalists about normative discourses (and not just about the normative). As Sellars(1956:63) has put it, under the banner of what he called '*psychological nominalism*':

'all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities -indeed, all awareness even of particulars – is a linguistic affair'.

The crux of the Sellarsian quote is that the use of concepts is *a linguistic affair* and need not have ontological and epistemological implications that bloat our ontology and enchant our epistemology¹¹. Concepts and their use is one thing, ontology and epistemology is another.

These few words on the 'use semantic strategy' added, we now turn to its application. Following Gibbard(1990), the core ingredient the use of normative sentences seems to reveal, and a theory of the semantics of such sentences should better take seriously, is the feature of '*endorsement*'¹². That is, when epistemic agents state that 'p is epistemically justified' or that 'S justifiedly believes that p' they seem to express some sort of endorsement (or acceptance/approval) for the belief in question.

⁹ Compare : L.Wittgenstein(1988) §197 'For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word... its meaning lies in its use' and §199 'To understand a language means to be a master of a technique'. And R.Brandom(1997:137-8) on Sellars : 'Sellars is a linguistic pragmatism about the conceptual order; that is, for him, grasp of a concept just is mastery of the use of a word'.

¹⁰ Some people might raise their eye-brows for invoking the notion of 'correctness' here. For as an antirealist, they might think, I am not entitled to appeal to standards of correctness. This is a discussion I cannot open here but I am tempted to think that standards of correctness and, more generally, objectivity can be grounded on the social practice of 'the game of giving and asking reasons'. This is a Sellarsian idea that R.Brandom(2000) has further developed and must wait for another time.

¹¹ That was G.Frege's(1980) seminal point in his distinction between sense and reference. Concepts are one thing, properties another.

¹² See A.Gibbard(1990:6-10).

The agent seems to approve the belief in question as if it is something (epistemically) good or valuable. All things considered, epistemic agents feel that holding a justified belief is something that is (epistemically) good and praiseworthy, something they can take credit for (and even be proud of). This is because epistemic justification seems to be necessary for knowledge (broadly construed) and, generally speaking, we think that knowledge is something desirable because it is (both instrumentally and intrinsically) valuable.

But epistemic agents don't just express endorsement *simpliciter*. They seem to express 'norm-endorsement'. The 'normative' character of endorsement should be understood, I think, in two senses. First, in the sense that epistemic agents implicitly endorse certain epistemic norms that license the belief in question (as epistemically good). For, clearly, by the agent's lights not just any belief can be endorsed as justified. By the agent's lights, there should be some epistemic norms constraining what can be taken as justified and what not. Second, in the sense that if an agent finds a belief to be (best) epistemically justified, then a responsible agent 'ought to endorse' that certain belief; at least on the presupposition that the epistemic agent is properly rational and able to stick to his best epistemic judgement.

These comments make clear that the feature of norm-endorsement is one of the basic desiderata that a theory of the semantics of propositional sentences predicating 'is epistemically justified' (or cognates) must accommodate. Indeed, following Gibbard's(1990) norm-expressivist conceptual framework, the core ingredient of norm-endorsement lies at the very *heart* of our proposal and allows us to kill two birds with one stone. That is, it allows us, on the one hand, to explain how norms constrain epistemic discourse (though not in the traditional realist sense) and, on the other hand, easily capture the endorsement ingredient that referentialist approaches seem to exactly miss.

For as in the moral case, 'the open question argument' bites again. It appears that is always possible for a clear-headed agent, without any semantic confusion, to question whether any epistemic property E (e.g. epistemic justification, rationality, knowledge, truth) is reducible to a natural property N (e.g. coherence, intuitions, epistemic virtues, reliability of belief-forming processes) and therefore resist endorsement of the belief in question. Whatever property a proposition p may bear (e.g. p is coherent), we cannot deduce that we ought to believe it.

Taking the norm-endorsement ingredient to be the cornerstone of our approach, this is then a first rough and general statement of the norm-expressivist proposal. The semantics of propositional sentences predicating ‘is epistemically justified’ (or cognates) are expressivist and the state of mind expressed noncognitive .i.e. attitudes of norm-endorsement. That is, attitudes of endorsement (or approval) of the epistemic norms that license the belief in question.

When we use sentences predicating ‘is epistemically justified’ (or cognates) we don’t purport to refer to a certain natural or nonnatural ‘epistemic justification’ property. Rather we express nonreferential mental states, namely, noncognitive attitudes of endorsement for the epistemic norms that license the belief. By analogy, when we use sentences predicating ‘is epistemically unjustified’ (or cognates) we express con-attitudes of norm-endorsement. That is, attitudes of disapproval for the epistemic norms that license the belief¹³.

This rough norm-expressivist picture of the semantics of epistemic justification claims and attributions is broadly Sellarsian in two key aspects. First, it is broadly Sellarsian because it rejects a ‘referential semantic strategy’ and appeals to a ‘use semantic strategy’. That is, justification claims and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain property. In line with Sellars’ ‘psychological nominalism’, it sees the epistemic practice of using justification claims and attribution as something following from plain linguistic activity and, if aptly done, practical mastery of concept-application without any extra ontological and meta-epistemological baggage.

Second, it is broadly Sellarsian because it states that justification claims and attributions both express endorsement and place the sentence in ‘the space of reasons’. For, to say that ‘p is justified’ or ‘S justifiedly believes that p’ is to endorse the belief as epistemically good. Here is Sellars making a parallel point about perceptual beliefs (1997:39):

‘...the latter of course is not *just* an experience. And this is the heart of the matter.

For to say that a certain experience is a *seeing that* something is the case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and- which is the point I wish to stress- to *endorse* that claim’(Sellar’s own emphasis).

¹³ There is much further work to be done here. For example, it must be explained how the epistemic norms licensing the content of the sentence involve (a) the norms of the relevant epistemic discourse (a priori, perceptual, self-knowledge discourses etc.) and (b) inferential norms. Also, justification claims and attributions express other things like Stevensonian commendation (‘believe so as well!’) and reliance. This work must way for another occasion, though.

And to say that *p* is justified is not just to endorse it but also place it in *the space of reasons*. That is, take it to be based on some good epistemic reasons. For as Sellars(1997:76) has notoriously put it (in terms of knowledge) :

‘The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of the episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says’(Sellar’s own emphasis).

Much more could be said on how this approach could exploit Sellarsian themes (e.g. the sociality of epistemic discourse and the grounding of epistemic objectivity in this sociality etc.) but I have to restrain myself here. We need first to lay out the basic building blocks of our theoretical construction. The rest can wait for more propitious times.

With the transposition step now completed, in the next section I proceed to sketch how epistemic norm-expressivism promises to reap at least the some of the same explanatory fruit with its ‘twin’ moral norm-expressivism.

V The Explanatory Fruitfulness of Epistemic Norm-Expressivism

As I just said, the norm-expressivist approach to epistemic discourse seems to promise to reap at least some of the same explanatory fruit with its ‘twin’ moral norm-expressivism. Let me elaborate.

First, contra the analytic naturalistic reductionist, it seems to explain the persistence of Moorean ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions that sabotage attempts to reduce the notion of epistemic justification to a natural property. The norm-expressivist suggests that the persistence of our Moorean intuitions can be *best* explained as due to the inexistence of such a property. There is no natural property capable of reducing epistemic justification and, hence, the notion should be considered to be unanalyzable. For the norm-expressivist, propositional sentences predicating ‘is epistemically justified’ (or cognates) do not purport to refer to such a property at all. They express attitudes of norm-endorsement and this follows from the plain use of epistemic concepts in ordinary linguistic activity.

Second, contra the nonnaturalist, the norm-expressivist approach seems to provide a naturalistic account of epistemic justification and thus eschews the epistemological and ontological problems that beset nonnaturalist approaches. For the expressivist, propositional sentences predicating ‘is epistemically justified’ (or cognates) do not

purport to refer to a 'queer' sui generis property of epistemic justification. That is, a property quite unlike the mundane causally efficacious properties of everyday life (e.g. water, trees etc.). Expressivists assert that there is no such 'queer' property and take propositional sentences predicating 'is epistemically justified'(or cognates) to express attitudes of norm-endorsement. Equally, for the expressivist there is no spooky antenna-like faculty of rational intuition tracking sentences that individuate the property of being epistemically justified. There are only attitudes of norm-endorsement which are a constitutive feature of our psychological make-up.

Third, norm-expressivism seems to explain epistemic supervenience. As it is often pointed out, any theory of the semantics of epistemic discourse must explain how epistemic properties (e.g. being epistemically justified or being epistemically rational) supervene on non-epistemic, natural properties(e.g. coherence etc.)¹⁴. That is, how two distinct but naturalistically identical situations (that is, sharing the very same natural properties) cannot individuate different epistemic properties. In slogan form, there can be no epistemic difference without a natural difference.

To contest supervenience is to accept that there could be a possible scenario where two distinct but naturalistically identical situations individuate different epistemic properties; something that appears absurd. For example, in two distinct but naturalistically identical situations, if in the first situation empirical-natural facts (fingerprints, eyewitnesses' testimony etc.) justify the belief that there has been murder then in the other situation it would have been absurd to think that facts justify, instead, the belief that there has been suicide.

One way to explain epistemic supervenience is in the ontological terms just formulated above, despite the fact that for the expressivist there are no epistemic properties. The expressivist could still 'speak with the vulgar' as if there are epistemic properties and suggest that two distinct but naturalistically identical situations should not differ in terms of individuation of epistemic properties. For the expressivist, if the situations are naturalistically identical then the epistemic agent should express the same epistemic evaluation.

A better way for the expressivist to explain epistemic supervenience is to follow R.Hare(1952) and A.Gibbard(2003) and spell out the notion of supervenience in terms

¹⁴ See J.Kim(1993); R.Feldman (2001); H.Vahid (2005).

of concepts, not properties¹⁵. This approach would allow us to sidestep the gratuitous invocation of the Humean notion of ‘speaking with the vulgar’ about an epistemic justification property. According to this concepts-based conception of epistemic supervenience, supervenience constrains how we should *use* epistemic concepts, not how epistemic properties are individuated; for the expressivist there are no such properties. If two distinct situations are found to be naturalistically identical then, our epistemic evaluation should be the same in both situations. Otherwise, our use and application of epistemic concepts will threaten to verge on the arbitrary and absurd for the reasons just explained above.

In conclusion, this promised theoretical fruit shows that epistemic norm-expressivism is an approach that we should take seriously. Of course, all this is very programmatic and inchoate and much more needs to be said. But I hope that this first gesture towards epistemic norm-expressivism won’t fail to convince that this approach, no matter what drawbacks might have, it has certain explanatory advantages that entitle one to pursue it in good hope.

V Conclusion

I have performed three basic things in this paper. First, in section II, I introduced the conceptual framework of Gibbard’s moral norm-expressivism. Second, in section III, I transposed this norm-expressivist conceptual framework to epistemic discourse and yielded a version of epistemic norm-expressivism (with Sellarsian overtones). Third, I outlined how epistemic norm-expressivism promises to reap at least some of the same explanatory fruit as, arguably, its twin moral norm-expressivism does. Admittedly, all this has been telegraphic but I hope that it suffices to count as a good first step towards motivating epistemic norm-expressivism as an approach to the semantics of epistemic discourse. The rest can wait for more opportune contexts.

¹⁵ This what J.Klagge(1988) has called ‘ascriptive’ instead of ‘ontological supervenience’.

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