

## The Unassertability of Contextualism

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- C:** Due to a characteristic of ‘knows’, whether ‘s knows that *p*’ is true depends on features of the conversational context in which ‘s knows that *p*’ is uttered.
- RS:** ‘When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition P, the standards for knowledge (the standards for how good an epistemic position one must be in to count as knowing) tend to be raised, if need be, to such a level as to require S’s belief in that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge.’ (DeRose 1995, 36)
- KAA:** One must: assert that *p* only if one knows that *p*.
- CV:** What epistemic position one must be in so that one can be warranted in asserting that *p* is a context variable matter.
- KAAC:** One must: assert that *p* in context *c* only if ‘s knows that *p*’ is true in *c*.

### The Unassertability of Contextualism

1. Assume: Contextualism.
2. Assume: KAA.
3. Whenever the contextualist attributes ‘I know that contextualism is true’ to herself, then for this attribution to be true, the contextualist should have a sensitive belief that contextualism is true. [Rule of Sensitivity]
4. The contextualist’s belief that contextualism is true, is not sensitive.
5. Hence, whenever the contextualist attributes ‘I know that contextualism is true’ to herself, this knowledge attribution will be false. [from 3 & 4]
6. If the contextualist asserts contextualism, she cannot truthfully be attributed knowledge of the truth of contextualism. [from 5]
7. Hence, if the contextualist asserts contextualism, she will violate KAAC. [from 2 & 5]