• Workshop overview
• Presentations

Workshop overview

This small informal graduate workshop on Epistemology will be held on Saturday 31st January (room to be confirmed). Everyone is welcome and there is no registration fee. The workshop will start at 2pm and end at 7.30pm. Any questions about this event should be directed to Georgi Gardiner at epistemologyworkshops@googlemail.com. This event is part of the Epistemology research group at Edinburgh.

Presentations

• Joe Kuntz, 'Being Virtue Ethical about Virtue Epistemology: Virtue Ethical Virtue Epistemology (VEVE)'

ABSTRACT. Most attempts to characterize virtue epistemology characterize epistemic virtues as reliable cognitive abilities. I argue that such accounts are only caricatures of what virtues really are. Taking a remedial lesson from virtue ethics, I formulate an account virtue epistemology - Virtue Ethical Virtue Epistemology (VEVE) - that has the necessary ties between true belief and epistemic agents to fit our intuitions about what counts as knowledge. VEVE does not falter to knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. Furthermore, VEVE can account for the varieties of the value problem for knowledge presented by Duncan Pritchard (manuscript). My aim is to offer an account and a preliminary defense of VEVE, and then open up the floor for fruitful discussion.

• Adam Carter, 'The Truth About Mere True Belief'

ABSTRACT. To follow.

• Georgi Gardiner, 'T-Monism, The Swamp and the Meno'

ABSTRACT. Meno Value is the difference in value between knowing and truly believing. In this paper I ask: is Meno Value epistemic value? If Epistemic T-Monism (the thesis that true belief is the sole ultimate fundamental epistemic value) is true, the Meno Value is not epistemic (in recent parlance: the swamp wins). I argue that Epistemic T-Monism is false and offer reason for thinking the Meno Value is epistemic.

• Evan Butts, 'Forbidden Fruit: More on Bad Truth'

ABSTRACT. Following upon Adam Carter's presentation on Kvanvig's "Pointless Truth", I would like to further explore the problem of bad truth and how it relates to the value of knowledge. I intend to show that, even when we take Kvanvig's advice to carefully distinguish a distinct cognitive/theoretical/epistemic value, and to not confuse all-things-considered judgments with prima facie judgments regarding the value of truths, there still looms the possibility of truths which are bad only (or, at least primarily) in cognitive/theoretical/epistemic dimension. Moreover, it seems that such a possibility is not limited to certain epistemological positions, but afflicts them all.