• Workshop overview
• Presentations

Workshop overview

This small informal graduate workshop on Social Epistemology will be held on Saturday 28th February, room 1.01 Dugald Stewart Building. Everyone is welcome and there is no registration fee. The workshop will start at 2pm and end at 7.30pm. Any questions about this event should be directed to Georgi Gardiner at epistemologyworkshops@googlemail.com. This event is part of the Epistemology research group at Edinburgh.

Presentations

• Eric Kerr (Edinburgh)

'The Compass Rose of Social Epistemology: Against the Specter of the Spectrum'

ABSTRACT. There have been several attempts by prominent scholars active in social epistemology to provide a classificatory system of the field. This presentation reviews some of these attempts, argues that they are deficient to characterise an emerging field and suggests an alternative.

• Emma Gordon (Edinburgh)

'Jennifer Lackey's 'A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance'' (pdf)

ABSTRACT. A critical discussion of Lackey's paper.

• Joe Kuntz (Edinburgh)

'TBC'

ABSTRACT. To follow.

• Peter Milne (Stirling)

''Assertion, Knowledge, Belief and Degrees of Belief'. '

ABSTRACT. Click here.

• Georgi Gardiner (Edinburgh)

'Epistemic Prescriptivism: The Social Side of Epistemic Irrealism'

ABSTRACT. Recently epistemology has been undergoing a 'value-turn'. It has become a goal of epistemology to account for the value and normativity in our epistemic discourse and epistemic reasoning. Accordingly epistemologists have been looking to metaethics for insight. This paper argues that the descriptive content of epistemic concepts such as justified, reliable and ought to believe are best understood with a network analysis and that criteria of application (when the terms apply) are context dependent, but that this (descriptivist) account is only part of the meaning of our epistemic concepts. I look to Hare's prescriptivism to account for the non-descriptive part of the meaning. Thus I align myself with hybrid irrealist theories, such as Gibbard's expressivism. Thus this paper aims to characterise the meaning of our epistemic discourse whilst doing justice to epistemic normativity.